EN
返回档案库

案例库 · 财务与会计 · 财务决策 · 2008–2010

这条还没译成中文,下面是英文原文。

In 2008 the Fed lent to securities dealers, not just banks, to stop a repo run.

After Bear Stearns, the Federal Reserve opened the discount window to primary dealers and took broad collateral, halting securities fire sales.

Federal Reserve · primary dealers · Bear Stearns

那一手

Primary dealers fund their bond inventories largely with repurchase agreements, so when repo lenders pulled back after the near-collapse of Bear Stearns, dealers faced having to dump securities into a falling market.

On March 16, 2008 the Fed announced the Primary Dealer Credit Facility, making discount-window style loans to primary dealers against a broad range of investment-grade debt, at the same rate the discount window charged. In the same release it trimmed the primary credit rate and extended loan maturities.

The creative move was extending the lender-of-last-resort function beyond insured banks to the securities dealers that had no window at all, and taking collateral the repo market would not.

为什么管用

  • Dealers had no bank-style lender of last resort
  • Repo funding collapsed, forcing forced sales of securities
  • Broad collateral let illiquid assets serve as pledge
  • The same-day standing access prevented fire-sale spirals
值了多少Extend the lender of last resort to nonbank dealers聪明

可以搬走什么

A lender of last resort that only serves banks leaves the shadow-banking core of the market exposed; widen the door and the collateral, not just the price.

后来呢

The PDCF was part of a suite of facilities (TAF, TSLF, PDCF) that together stabilized the funding markets, and it was later broadened to accept more collateral. It made the Fed the de facto backstop for the dealer community, a precedent that shaped later crisis lending.

资料来源

发现哪里写错了?告诉我们。

同一路聪明