The solution
After Mexico stopped servicing its $80 billion of debt in August 1982, Latin American countries spent years rescheduling without any real exit, while US money-center banks held developing-country loans worth nearly three times their capital.
In 1989 Treasury Secretary Nicholas Brady proposed permanent debt and service reductions. Under the plan, creditors exchanged old loans for new bonds collateralized by zero-coupon US Treasuries, guaranteeing principal repayment; banks that accepted the exchange could sell the bonds, creating a market price and a floor.
Between 1989 and 1994 lenders forgave about $61 billion, roughly a third of the debt, across eighteen countries that committed to economic reforms. The collateral worked as a subsidy that made the haircut acceptable.
What it achieved
Guarantee principal so banks accept a haircut
Why it worked
Collateralized principal made the new bonds safe enough for banks to book the exchange.
Tradability gave lenders an exit instead of decades of rescheduling.
Debtors got relief and regained access to markets as confidence returned.
The IMF and US government pushed both sides to settle rather than let the crisis drag on.
What can be applied
To make creditors take a loss, hand them a liquid, partly guaranteed asset: a marketable exit closes a crisis that endless rescheduling only prolonged.
Aftermath
Mexico and other Brady issuers saw their bonds become the foundation of the emerging-market debt market, and the countries regained access to private capital. Critics note the plan delivered less actual debt reduction than its reputation suggests, but it ended the 1980s standoff.
FOLLOW THE EVIDENCE
The sources
- Latin American Debt Crisis of the 1980s federalreservehistory.org
- Geithner Revisits Brady Bonds forbes.com
- Debt Schemes archive.nytimes.com