Hurricane Andrew tore through Florida in 1992 and produced roughly $17 billion in insured losses — about double what catastrophe models had predicted — bankrupting several insurers outright and burning through so much of the reinsurance industry's own capital that the reinsurers many insurers depended on for worst-case protection simply stopped writing new hurricane coverage, or priced what little capacity remained far beyond what insurers could afford.

military members and their families and heavily concentrated along the hurricane-exposed Southeast coast, faced exactly this squeeze: a single storm bad enough to breach its reserves could threaten the company, and the reinsurance market it would normally turn to for that protection no longer had the capital to sell it at any reasonable price. sector — was itself simply too small relative to the largest imaginable hurricane loss to remain the only place that risk could live.

Issued a bond passing hurricane risk to investors, who earned high coupons but lost principal on big losses — renting the capital markets' $19 trillion as reinsurance.

Reinsurers lacked capital after Andrew, so traditional coverage was unavailable.

Capital markets held trillions, far exceeding reinsurers' capacity.

Hurricane risk was uncorrelated with stocks and bonds, attracting investors.

Bond structure let investors earn high yields for accepting low-probability losses.

When specialist risk markets are exhausted, repackage the risk as a security for broader capital markets.

Demand for the bond ran to roughly $1 billion against the roughly $150 million USAA had originally planned to raise, and the company ultimately placed over $477 million to meet it — because a catastrophe bond behaved as a nearly zero-beta asset, moving independently of stocks and other bonds and offering real diversification alongside a high yield; that year's tranche returned about 11 percent. The deal, the largest cat bond issued to that point, demonstrated at scale what smaller bonds pioneered a year earlier by underwriters like St.

FOLLOW THE EVIDENCE

The sources

  1. Catastrophe and the Capital Markets Wharton Magazine, University of Pennsylvania · magazine.wharton.upenn.edu
  2. Catastrophe Bonds – A to Z Insurance Journal · insurancejournal.com