EN
Back to the archive

The encyclopedia · Product & Design · Product decision · 2015

Samsung Pay won over old card machines by faking a magnetic strip

While Apple and Google pushed NFC and begged merchants to upgrade, Samsung's MST made the phone look like a magnetic card — any POS accepted it from day one

Samsung Electronics

the move

When Samsung Pay launched — Korea on 20 August 2015, the United States on 28 September 2015 — Apple Pay and Android Pay had defined mobile payments as an NFC problem: great technology, but every shop needed a new terminal. Samsung's answer came from a 2015 acquisition: LoopPay, whose Magnetic Secure Transmission (MST) made the phone emit a rapidly changing magnetic field that a card-swipe reader interprets as a real card swiping. The result, as Samsung put it, was a payment service that worked on virtually any terminal that could read a magnetic card — from day one.

The strategy bought the network effect instead of waiting for it: no merchant upgrade required, so usability was immediate; where NFC was supported the phone used NFC instead (fast, but optional); and the claim of 'most existing POS' coverage was the wedge Apple and Google lacked. In the first year Samsung Pay cleared nearly 100 million transactions across seven countries, with more than 2 trillion won of cumulative transactions in Korea and 4 million-plus registered cards.

The genius was also the sunset: as NFC terminals finally spread, Samsung discontinued MST support starting with the Galaxy S21 (2021). The technology that had won the early game by mimicking the old rails was retired precisely because the new rails had arrived — a deliberate, self-terminating strategy that captured the compatibility window and then moved with the infrastructure.

why it works

  • Compatibility beats features: merchants adopt what works on machines they already own — MST removed the capex barrier that NFC's chicken-and-egg could not solve.
  • Dual-mode hedged the transition: NFC used where present, MST elsewhere, meant the product worked everywhere either infrastructure existed — adoption wasn't hostage to one standard's rollout.
  • The play was designed to self-terminate: MST existed to bridge until NFC arrived; killing it in 2021 was confirmation the bridge had done its job — an exit as deliberate as the entry.
the payoffEmulate old rails for adoptioninspired

what transfers

When the new standard is blocked by old hardware, don't lobby — emulate: make existing machines think you're the old thing, take today's market, and retire the trick when the upgrade lands

what came after

Samsung Pay's MST era (2015-2021) became the canonical case of 'infrastructure-compatible innovation' in payments; other markets copied the frame, and Samsung's bridge-built user base carried into its NFC and wallet services through the 2020s.

references

spotted an error? The archive wants to know.

same kind of clever