The encyclopedia · Strategy & Leadership · Operational decision · 1995-2001
Alaska ended the fish race by handing out tradable catch shares.
The 1995 halibut IFQ program replaced a few-day derby with a months-long season, curbing overcapacity and raising value.
NOAA Fisheries (North Pacific)
the move
By the 1980s Alaska's halibut fleet had overcapitalized, and tighter rules only made the race for fish worse. In the final years before reform, the entire catch of about 43 million pounds was landed in just a few days.
In 1995 managers introduced an Individual Fishing Quota program for the fixed-gear halibut and sablefish fishery. Each harvester received a share of a capped total, transferable under rules that limited concentration and required owner participation.
Owners chose when to fish, so the derby collapsed into a season of several months. Catch limits were rarely exceeded, overfishing stopped, and bycatch and ghost fishing fell, while fresh-market prices and steadier jobs replaced the brutal, low-pay rush.
why it works
- The race to fish forced unsafe, rushed and low-quality landings
- A fixed share gives each harvester a stake in the stock's health
- Transferable quota lets effort flow to the most efficient boats
- Concentration and owner-on-board rules kept outsiders from buying the fleet
what transfers
When the race is the failure, hand out a tradable right to a fixed total: the same quota yields better prices, safer work and less overcapacity.
what came after
Overfishing ceased and seasonal work became steadier and better paid, but the program also raised questions about access for coastal communities and new entrants, since quota went to those with history in the fishery. It became a reference case for catch-share design.
references
- United States Alaska Halibut and Sablefish Fixed Gear Individual Fishing Quota Program
- The Pacific halibut longline fishery (NOAA Technical Memorandum)
spotted an error? The archive wants to know.