The solution
In 1999 the phone industry bet its own web would beat the PC web to mobile. Ericsson, Motorola, Nokia and Unwired Planet had written the Wireless Application Protocol together, and the Nokia 7110, marketed as the world's first WAP media phone, put it in shops that year. The mood was euphoric: BBC News described surfing for train timetables from a wine bar, and Orange predicted 60% of new handsets would be WAP-enabled within a year. Even Japan's rival i-mode — two million sign-ups since February — was reported as proof the mobile web was imminent.
The standard's design quietly guaranteed disappointment. WAP filtered text out of web pages and rebuilt it in WML through carrier-controlled portals, so the real web stayed out of reach — a text service sold as 'the mobile internet'. BT Cellnet's 'Surf the BT Cellnet' campaign even showed a man riding a surfboard through cyberspace. By November 2000 analysts said such ads had set WAP take-up back six months — 'when you over-hype, you're left with disappointed customers' — and a Which? investigation found half of 120 UK stores failed to warn shoppers that WAP could not reach the web.
The counter-example was Japan. NTT DoCoMo's i-mode skipped WAP, kept pages simple and split revenue with content providers — two million Japanese had signed up by late 1999, even as Europe's WAP portals stalled. WAP itself outlived the mockery: packet-priced GPRS and portal revivals like Vodafone Live! kept the protocol running for years. But once phones could run full HTML browsers, the separate mini-web lost its reason to exist, and WAP browsing faded with the decade.
What it achieved
A separate mini-web cut users off from the real one
Why it worked
WAP was engineered for 1999's narrowband phones: text filtered through proxies, rebuilt in WML, delivered by carrier portals. The design made sense of the network, not of the promise.
The portal model gave carriers a gate to charge for — so the same companies selling WAP had an incentive to keep users away from the open web it imitated.
Marketing promised surfing; the product delivered headlines on a tiny screen. The gap between the two became the story, and early adopters punished it.
i-mode proved the alternative: simple pages, revenue shared with content owners, and no pretense of being the web — which is why Japan's version flourished while Europe's stalled.
What can be applied
A standard that strands users on an island of bespoke content loses to the open web the moment devices catch up. Build for the ecosystem that exists; compatibility compounds, isolation doesn't.
Aftermath
GPRS packet pricing and packaged portals like Vodafone Live! later revived WAP traffic, and the protocol quietly ran ringtones and operator services into the smartphone era. The WAP Forum's work passed into the Open Mobile Alliance. When iPhone and Android arrived with real HTML browsers, nobody rebuilt the walled gardens — WAP browsing simply disappeared. The durable lesson went to i-mode: simple pages, honest marketing and shared revenue with content makers beat a closed portal pretending to be the web.
FOLLOW THE EVIDENCE
The sources
- Wap - wireless window on the world news.bbc.co.uk
- BT Cellnet rapped over 'misleading' WAP ads web.archive.org