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The encyclopedia · Strategy & Leadership · Strategic decision · 2013

Ofcom's 4G auction let bidders buy packages, ending the exposure problem.

For the UK's 4G auction Ofcom used a combinatorial clock auction: bidders bid on combinations of spectrum blocks, so nobody was stranded with half a network.

Ofcom · Vodafone Group · BT Group

the move

The UK's 4G launch needed 800 MHz spectrum, ideal for coverage, and 2.6 GHz spectrum, ideal for capacity, and operators valued the two bands jointly because a network needs both. In a conventional single-lot auction a bidder could win coverage spectrum without the capacity to use it, the 'exposure problem', which makes bidders cautious and prices unreliable.

Ofcom adopted a combinatorial clock auction, the first full use of the format for spectrum. Clock rounds raised category prices while bidders expressed demand for packages; a supplementary round let them bid final values for combinations, and winners paid the clock prices. Package bidding meant no winner could be stranded with half a network.

After more than 50 rounds, five bidders won: Everything Everywhere paid £588.9 million, Telefónica UK £550 million plus an obligation to cover 98% of the UK population indoors, Vodafone £790.8 million, Hutchison 3G UK £225 million, and BT's Niche Spectrum Ventures £186.5 million. Total proceeds were £2.34 billion, below the OBR's £3.5 billion forecast because Ofcom's stated aim was competition and rollout, not revenue.

why it works

  • Package bidding solves the exposure problem: nobody wins coverage spectrum without the capacity to use it.
  • Clock rounds give transparent price discovery across dozens of rounds before final bids.
  • Attaching a 98% indoor coverage obligation to one 800 MHz lot delivered public value beyond the price.
  • Designing for competition rather than revenue produced lower prices and faster 4G rollout.
the payoffLet bidders bid on packages, not single blocksclever

what transfers

When a license is only valuable as part of a bundle, auction the bundles: package bidding let UK operators buy the exact spectrum combinations their networks needed and removed the exposure problem.

what came after

EE launched 4G within months using existing spectrum, and O2 and Vodafone followed in August 2013 once their 800 MHz licenses were awarded. Ofcom monitored the coverage obligation, and the combinatorial clock auction became the template for spectrum awards in many other countries, as auction theorist Paul Cramton documented in his review of the design.

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