In the mid-1980s Morocco's telecoms were run directly by the ministry: chronic under-investment, less than half of expressed demand met, and congested networks. The state first created ONPT (1984) as an autonomous public operator, then backed it with two sequential World Bank projects — the second a US$100 million loan (3557-MOR) implemented 1993–97 under a performance contract between ONPT and the government.

The results doubled the system in six years: exchange capacity rose from 858,000 to 1,683,000 lines, connected main lines from 657,000 to 1,375,000, with 99.3% of switching digitized by end-1997. Staff productivity improved from 17.5 employees per 1,000 lines in 1992 to 10.3 in 1997 — while employment actually grew from 11,500 to 14,700, defusing the usual labor opposition to reform.

Cost discipline was the quiet triumph: the plan had budgeted about US$2.1 billion for 1,076,000 new lines (US$1,950 per line); ONPT delivered 1,085,000 lines for US$1.3 billion — roughly US$1,200 per line, about 40% under budget — largely self-financed from its commercial cash flow while contributing to government finances.

Only then came the structural break: Law 24/96, adopted June 29 and promulgated August 7, 1997, ended the monopolies, split ONPT into Itissalat Al-Maghrib (IAM, later Maroc Telecom) and postal operator Barid Al-Maghrib, and created the ANRT regulator — fifteen years of sequenced Bank engagement culminating in a liberalized sector.

Corporatize under a performance contract before privatizing

A performance contract gave the monopoly commercial targets and autonomy before ownership changed, proving the business model first.

Growing employment while doubling productivity removed the political blockage that kills most state-enterprise reforms.

Sequencing — corporatize, then legislate, then open to competition — meant IAM started life financially solid rather than distressed.

Sustained engagement across two projects over fifteen years let each reform build on credibility earned by the last.

Selling a monopoly that cannot run commercially just privatizes the dysfunction; a binding performance contract builds the track record that makes liberalization and sale possible.

Itissalat Al-Maghrib was renamed Maroc Telecom and partially privatized in 2001, when Vivendi bought a 35% stake; it later listed in Casablanca and Paris (2004) and became one of Africa's largest operators. Morocco licensed a second operator (Médi Telecom) in 1999, and mobile penetration eventually dwarfed the fixed network ONPT built. The ICR rated both Bank and borrower performance highly satisfactory.

FOLLOW THE EVIDENCE

The sources

  1. Morocco - Telecommunications Sector Restructuring Project (Implementation Completion Report No. 17971) documents.worldbank.org