The solution
Ceará is Brazil's drought state: rain falls in a few months, reservoirs carry the rest of the year, and for a century the federal agency DNOCS ran the big dams while allocation was settled in crises by political muscle. Upstream users pumped first, downstream valleys were left with mud, and each drought meant emergency water trucks and patronage. The reflexive fix was always the same — build another dam.
The 1992 state water law broke the pattern. It created COGERH in 1993, a company-style water agency outside the civil service — the World Bank made its creation a lending condition. In 1997 COGERH took over operation of the federal mega-reservoirs, funded by bulk-water charges: Fortaleza's industries paid about 15 times the rate charged to the city utility, so the referee no longer depended on anyone's annual budget. COGERH's field sociologists then organized 36 reservoir user commissions, which set each year's release volumes in public once the rains reveal how much water actually exists.
The design made rationing legitimate: quotas flex with measured storage, rules bind everyone at once, and small users got a seat they never had. Registered water users grew from 4,600 in 2003 to 15,500 in 2010; COGERH's bulk deliveries rose from 6.9 to 17.5 m³/s over 2000–2011; and by 2011 charges covered 94% of its costs, against 70% in 2003. One honest caveat: irrigators mostly dodged the charges (80% non-payment), and the follow-on infrastructure project drew only a 'moderately unsatisfactory' rating.
What it achieved
Negotiate quotas in public from what reservoirs really hold
Why it worked
Allocation happens before the crisis: once the rainy season reveals actual storage, quotas are negotiated in public, so cuts cannot be blamed on political favorites.
Charging the biggest users — industries first, since they were already paying for bulk water — made COGERH self-financing, so enforcement stopped hinging on annual budget fights.
Quotas are shares of measured storage, so droughts scale automatically and no emergency renegotiation under panic is needed.
COGERH's field teams gave fishermen, small irrigators and other previously voiceless users their first seat, building the legitimacy that made the cuts stick.
What can be applied
When a scarce resource is rationed by crisis politics, set annual public quotas from measured storage before the crisis hits, and charge the biggest users so the referee pays its own bills.
Aftermath
The system outlived five governors and a successor administration that axed the user-mobilization unit in 2003. When the 2012–2018 drought pushed reservoirs to 11% of their 18.6 billion m³ capacity, COGERH's 2017 rules — 75% of stored water for human consumption, 16% agriculture, 7% industry — rationed supply without collapse. In 2019 the World Bank returned with a Water Security and Governance Project that feeds basin demand data into the negotiated allocation. Unfinished business: formal permits need not respect negotiated quotas, and irrigators remain lightly charged.
FOLLOW THE EVIDENCE
The sources
- Institutional and policy analysis of river basin management: the Jaguaribe river basin, Ceará, Brazil documents.worldbank.org
- ICR Review: Brazil Ceara Integrated Water Resources Management Project (ICRR14158) documents.worldbank.org
- Implementation Completion Report: Ceará Water Resources Management Pilot Project documents.worldbank.org
- Project Appraisal Document: Brazil Ceara Water Security and Governance Project documents.worldbank.org