#1002 1998 · Primary School Deworming Programme (Busia, Kenya) · Global health / development
Clustering at the school, not the child, showed deworming's payoff on untreated neighbors
问题
Individual trials found tiny deworming effects and the cheap pill looked worth the effort, so donors under-invested
背景
Intestinal worms — hookworm, roundworm, whipworm, schistosomiasis — infect more than a quarter of humanity and are most damaging to school-age children, draining them into anaemia and low attendance. The drug is cheap, about half a US dollar per treated child. Yet the credible evidence was thin and discouraging: trials that randomly assigned the treatment to individual children within the same school found small or insignificant effects on health and schooling, apparently confirming that deworming was a marginal investment a donor could skip.
The discouraging trials shared a blind spot. Worms are transmitted person to person through the shared environment of a school; when some children in a room are treated but the rest are not, the treated ones are promptly reinfected by the untreated ones, and the untreated ones are readmitted to the worm pool. Everyone in the same school swims in the same worm reservoir, so an individual-level trial quietly destroys the very benefit it is trying to measure.
换别人会怎么做
The standard move is randomized treatment at the individual level, and it is the textbook answer — but it pits two children against the same worm reservoir, so the treated child is reinfected by the untreated one and the control child benefits from the treated one. Individual randomization actively erases the effect it exists to find.
他们看到了什么
An externality has a carrier, and you see it only by randomizing that carrier. The worm travels through the shared school pool, so the cluster to randomize was the school, not the child.
那一手
Miguel and Kremer ran the evaluation the other way: instead of randomizing the drug to single children inside each school, they randomly phased deworming across whole schools. This preserved the transmission channel, so treated and untreated schools could be compared while the worm pool was actually broken at the school boundary.
为什么管用
Deworming works through a double channel that individual trials split in half. Treated children shed fewer eggs, so children around them are infected less; clustering treatment at the school boundary let the worm pool drop below the reinfection level, which is precisely when mass treatment flips from helping the dosed child to protecting everyone in the pool. Randomizing between schools measured both effects at once — the direct dose effect and the transmission spillover — while individual trials cancelled the second against itself and reported only the weak remainder. The same design that made the effect hard to see was the design that, inverted, made it huge.
值了多少
Deworming cut absenteeism by a quarter; untreated neighbors gained because transmission fell. The externalities justified full subsidy.
什么时候会失灵
It fails when there is no shared coupling to exploit — for interventions whose benefit is purely individual, school-level clustering buys nothing. It needs the off-target spillover to be large enough to dominate the direct effect, and it needs a boundary (a school, a neighborhood) the transmission respects; where people cross boundaries freely the externality leaks away. And the subsidy logic depended on the untreated neighbors being reachable for free — where the disease reservoir lies outside the treated pool entirely, treating inside it cannot break transmission.
后来呢
The 2004 Econometrica paper became the empirical backstop for mass deworming worldwide — WHO school-based deworming programs and GiveWell's top-rated charities rest on it — and a ten-year follow-up in the QJE found long-run impacts on earnings, with a conservative 32% internal rate of return.
资料来源
- [1]NBER Working Paper 8481 — Worms: Education and Health Externalities in KenyaNational Bureau of Economic Research, 2001nber.org
- [2]AEA RCT Registry — Worms: Identifying Impacts on Education and Health in the Presence of Treatment ExternalitiesAmerican Economic Association, 2016socialscienceregistry.org